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ABSTRACT
Recently the social-economic divide increased in Europe which might endanger the Eu-
ropean project. However, there is a lack of current research that provides results for
policy implications to counteract this development. Therefore, this paper replicates the
work of Beblo and Knaus (2001) and analyses the composition of income inequality
for the EU-28 in 2014 by using data from the European Survey on Income and Liv-
ing Conditions in two steps. First, I apply the Theil index and additively decompose
the sources of inequality into a within- and between-component by countries, country
groups and demographic groups. Second, I analyse the impact of government redistri-
bution on income inequality. The results show that inequality is highest for households
with household heads older than 59 years and lowest for households with children.
Moreover, high income countries have lower inequality, higher social expenditures and
redistribute more than low income countries. On country group level, I illustrate that
Social-Democratic countries have the lowest income inequality and redistribute most,
while the opposite holds true for Baltic countries.
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1 Introduction
According to the latest results of the OECD, “the socio-economic divide has been on the rise in
Europe”, which hampers social cohesion, lowers social trust in institutions and fuels political
and social inequality (OECD, 2017, p. 5). Therefore, income inequality is one of the most
important concerns for the future of the European Union. High levels of social cohesion
contribute to a continuation of the European project and income distribution is assumed to
be one crucial factor for the setting up of a joint social policy at the European level. Re-
sults of Eurofound (2017) support the demand for a new European agenda, as they find
an increasing role of welfare state redistribution for income inequality in Europe since the
financial crisis in 2008. The impact of income disparities on social cohesion and the increas-
ing influence of government redistribution on the income distribution motivates this study
to analyse the composition of income inequality in the EU-28.
Hoffmeister (2009) clusters the relevant literature in two strands. The first strand covers
literature with regard to within-country income inequality1, whereas the second deals with
literature that analyses income distribution on the supranational level. As I analyse the
aggregated inequality for the EU-28, this study contributes to the latter, in which income
distribution across individuals is analysed jointly for different countries. The pivotal work
of Atkinson (1996) provides an early approach of the second strand and measures income
inequality in Europe by using data from the Luxembourg Income Study.2 To analyse income
distribution on a global level Milanovic (2002) introduced the World Income Distribution
Dataset. Lakner and Milanovic (2016) improved this dataset and contribute results of the
global income distribution for around 90% of the world’s population between 1988 and
2008. However, the most relevant study concerning social cohesion at the European level is
carried out by Beblo and Knaus (2001). In their paper they measure income inequality for
the founding countries of the European Monetary Union by calculating Theil indices, which
they decompose into a within- and between-component. Using the 1995 wave of the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel their results show a Theil index of aggregated inequality
in Europe of around 0.185. Moreover, differences between-countries account for 3.4% of
market income inequality but increase their contribution significantly after transfers and
taxes and contribute 9.3% to disposable income inequality. This induces the assumption
that income levels differ remarkably between the analysed countries and that the welfare
state regime plays an important role for social cohesion at the European level. A more re-
cent approach that measures aggregated inequality in Europe is carried out by Hoffmeister
(2009). He refers to the EU-25 and detects a convergence of national income levels and
1Research with regard to this strand was carried out, amongst many others, by Atkinson et al. (1995),
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Smeeding and Grodner (2000), Beblo and Knaus (2001), Hoffmeister
(2009) and Bouvet (2010).
2More recent results for Europe are presented by Beblo and Knaus (2001), Papatheodorou and Pavlopoulos
(2003), Boix (2004), Morrisson and Murtin (2004), Brandolini (2007), Hoffmeister (2009), Papatheodorou
and Pavlopoulos (2014) and Eurofound (2017).
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within-country personal income inequality between 1994/1995 and 1999/2000. Further-
more, he states that inequality is rising in the Social-Democratic regime but decreasing in
Mediterranean welfare states. Moreover, Papatheodorou and Pavlopoulos (2014) analyse
the development of inequality in the EU-15 between 1996 and 2008. By calculating Theil
indices they find that the contribution of between-country inequality decreases significantly
from 14.8% in 1996 to 4.9% in 2008. Eurofound (2017) measures aggregated inequality for
the EU-28 between 2005 and 2013 and reports a decrease in income convergence among
European countries and an increase of income inequality in Europe since 2008.
This paper contributes to the findings of Beblo and Knaus (2001) and extends the focus on
an enlarged EU and analyses whether the social cohesion could be triggered throughout the
last 19 years. Therefore, I replicate the study of Beblo and Knaus (2001) and show how
their results change when I use income data for 2014 and include all member states of the
EU-28. In addition, I add an additional level of analysis to their approach and decompose
income inequality by country groups with similar socio-economic policies and institutions.
Thus, this study puts particular emphasis on the role of the welfare state on income inequal-
ity.3 Based on the contributions the main research questions are the following: (1) What
is the composition of income inequality in the EU-28? (2) What is the effect of government
redistribution on income inequality in the EU-28? To answer the first research question, I use
the Theil index and additively decompose income inequality into a within- and between-
component by countries, country groups and demographic groups. With regard to the sec-
ond research question I analyse the impact of taxes and social transfers by comparing the
amount of income inequality for market and disposable income. The results are followed
by comprehensive robustness checks that cover methodological as well as pension-system-
related differences. As a result, this study detects the sources of income inequality in the
EU-28, provides scientific foundation for a future social union and enables policy makers to
implement appropriate policies to increase social cohesion.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying
data of this study. In section 3 I illustrate the characteristics of the Theil index and its
decomposition. The composition of income inequality is analysed in section 4. Section 5
discusses the redistribution impact of taxes and social transfers. In section 6, I check the
robustness of my results in a sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 7 summarises the main
findings of this study.
3The role of the welfare state regime on income distribution is argued, among others, by Atkinson et al.
(1995), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Smeeding and Grodner (2000) Beblo and Knaus (2001), Hoffmeis-
ter (2009) and Esping-Andersen and Myles (2011)
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2 Data
The results in this study are based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC), which covers data of 555,405 observations with incomes greater than
zero in 2014 for the EU-28.4 The main variable of interest is equivalised disposable household
income (HX090)5 using the “OECD-modified scale”.6 This income variable reflects income
after transfers and taxes and is used for calculations with regard to disposable income. To
account for price differentials among countries I convert incomes into a comparable base
by using purchasing power parity exchange rates (2014) from Eurostat. Furthermore, all
observations are weighted by using the personal cross-sectional weight (RB050). To cluster
the observations in section 4.4 into demographic subgroups, I use the age at the end of the
income reference period (PX020). Moreover, to measure the effect of government redistri-
bution on income inequality in section 5 I calculate equivalised market household incomes,
which are defined by taking the sum of gross employee cash (PY010G), pensions from individ-
ual private plans (PY080G) and cash benefits or losses from self-employment (PY050G) on the
personal level as well as income from rental of a property or land (HY040G), regular inter-
household cash transfer received (HY080G), interests, dividends, profit from capital investment
in uncorporated business (HY090G) and income received by people aged under 16 (HY110G)
on the household level. According to Atkinson and Marlier (2010), the reference period for
income data in the EU-SILC is a fixed 12-month period and normally the previous calendar
year in which the survey-data collection is carried out. Moreover, they mention that the
only two exceptions are the United Kingdom, which defines its income reference period in
the current year, and Ireland, which defines its income reference period to the last twelve
months prior to the interview.
The EU-SILC provides comparative data on income, poverty, social exclusion and living
conditions in Europe. Like any survey, however, it suffers from problems with regard to data
collection. Paturot et al. (2013) argue that low income households might not be reached,
are less likely to respond and might understate benefit income or income earned in the
informal sector. Moreover, they state that high income households are under-represented
in household survey data because they do under-report or refuse to give any information
about their income.7
To cluster the analysed countries into groups with similar socio-economic policies and insti-
tutions in Table 1, I follow an approach of Aristei and Perugini (2015).8 Their framework
4The nature of the Theil allowsme only to use incomes greater than zero. Moreover, I only use observations
with a personal base weight greater than zero.
5To facilitate the replication of my results I put the EU-SILC variable names in parenthesis.
6The “OECD-modified scale” was first proposed by Hagenaars et al. (1994) who assume an equal distribu-
tion of resources within the household and assign a value of 1 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to each
additional adult member and 0.3 to each child younger than 14 years old (OECD, 2013).
7See Eckerstorfer et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion and a possible adjustment of this problem within
the context of wealth distribution.
8As Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Romania and Malta are not in the framework of Aristei and Perugini
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takes the institutional dimension of income inequality into account and will be used to iden-
tify patterns in income distribution and the construction of inequality on the national and
European level. One main advantage compared to the pivotal work of Esping-Andersen
(2013), who only distinguishes three types of welfare state regimes, is that Aristei and Pe-
rugini (2015) provide six categories of country groups. Thus, the categorization framework
of Aristei and Perugini (2015) offers a more nuanced approach to cluster the member states
of the EU-28. Their classification is based on the varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and
Soskice (2001), who cluster countries by the distinction between liberal and coordinated
market economies. This approach is extended by embedding the criticism of Coates (2000)
and Amable (2003), that underlines the necessity of a broader institutional dimension. Fur-
thermore, the classification considers literature on post-socialist states9 and is based on
institutional indicators.
TABLE 1 — Country groups, based on Aristei and Perugini (2015)
Country Group Abbreviation Countries
Baltic countries BC Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Continental European economies CEE Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, The Netherlands
Eastern European countries EEC Bulgaria, Croatia, The Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Liberal market economies LME Ireland, United Kingdom
Mediterranean countries MC Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain
Social-Democratic countries SDC Denmark, Finland, Sweden
Notes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Romania and Malta are not in the framework of Aristei and Perugini (2015). Thus, I cluster
these countries by taking the specific characteristics of the country groups into account.
3 Methodology
To measure inequality in Europe I choose the Theil index T(1), an inequality measure from
the generalised entropy family. First introduced by the seminal work of Theil (1967), this
index can be written as
T (1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1

yi
µ

ln

yi
µ

(1)
with
N size of the population
yi individual income
µ mean income of the population
(2015), I cluster these countries by taking the specific characteristics of the country groups into account.
9See Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009), Lane (2007), Bohle and Greskovits (2007) or Drahokoupil et al.
(2008).
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In the case of perfect equality each individual in the sample has exactly the same income
and the Theil index is zero, which represents its minimum value. On the other hand, if there
is total inequality one individual has all the income and the Theil index equals ln(N), its
maximum value. Bourguignon (1979) points out that Theil indices have several favourable
characteristics as they “[...] (a) are continuous and differentiable in all individual incomes; (b)
are symmetric; (c) are income-homogeneous of degree zero; (d) satisfy the symmetry axiom for
population; (e) satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition; and (f) are decomposable” Bourguignon
(1979, p. 902).10 The last property enables me to express T(1) as the sum of a within-
and between-group component, which is shown in equation 2. This is what Cowell (2000)
describes as the “accountant’s approach”, which is of great concern when I choose the Theil
index, as it does not only take an individual country’s inequality into consideration but also
the heterogeneity between countries at the European level. Moreover, Bourguignon (1979),
Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980) state that T(1) can be decomposed into subgroups such
that
T (1) =
K∑
k=1
sk × T (1)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
within component
+
K∑
k=1
sk ln

µk
µ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
between component
(2)
with
K population subgroup
sk share of total income of subgroup k
T (1)k Theil index of subgroup k
µ mean income
µk mean income of subgroup k
The first term in equation 2 illustrates the within-component, which is the weighted sum of
the subgroup Theils T (1)k. The second term describes the inequality that arises due to dif-
ferences between subgroups K , which depends on the variation in mean income levels µk.
To weight the contribution of the respective subgroup, which are in my case countries, coun-
try groups and demographic groups, I make use of its total income share sk, that expresses
its economic weight in the total population.
As an alternative to the Theil index, Hoffmeister (2009) calculates the Mean Logarithmic
Deviation (MLD), which uses purely population basedweights instead of income share based
weights. However, this study follows the argumentation of Beblo and Knaus (2001), who
underline that income share based weights are more convenient because they reflect each
country’s political power with regard to its economic standing in the EU-28 better than
population based weights. Political power also reflects the level of influence a country has
10For more information about the nature of additive decomposable inequality measures see, among others,
Shorrocks (1980).
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on building a future social union and the development of social cohesion at the European
level. Thus, I put the main emphasis on calculating inequality measures by using the Theil
instead of the MLD. Nevertheless, this study tests the robustness of its results by using the
MLD in a sensitivity analysis in section 6.
According to Hoffmeister (2009), the Gini coefficient is also widely used for measuring in-
equality but is unsuitable for this study as it is not easily additive decomposable. He argues
that, when decomposed, the Gini falls, beside a within- and between-component, into an
overlap-component. Moreover, he states that the more important the overlap-component
compared to the within- and between-component, the more homogeneous the population.11
Therefore, Hoffmeister (2009) underlines that the Gini provides information about the pop-
ulation’s stratification but does not account for the relative importance of inequality result-
ing within and between subgroups. However, to analyse the sources of income inequality,
the latter characteristic is essential. Thus, I calculate Theil indices in the following section
of this study and show how much of the income inequality is due to differences within and
between countries, country groups and demographic groups.
4 The decomposition of income inequality in the EU-28
To answer the first research question of this paper, this section provides results about the
decomposition of income inequality in the EU-28 by using equivalised disposable household
income. In a first step, I give a short overview of how income is distributed in the EU-28 and
among country groups. Moreover, I decompose the Theil index into a within- and between-
component for three different subgroups, which are defined as countries, country groups
and demographic groups. This approach illustrates the contribution of inequality within
and between subgroups to the aggregated inequality of the EU-28. These findings identify
the main drivers behind income inequality on country and European level.
4.1 The income distribution in Europe
To draw a general picture of the income distribution in the EU-28, Figure 1 illustrates how
annual mean incomes range among income percentiles. Treating the EU-28 as one coun-
try the results show that the annual median income amounts 15,713€. Moreover, I find
a tremendous gap between the bottom and the top of the income distribution as the 1st
percentile has an annual income of around 919€, while the 99th percentile has an income
of 63,540€. Thus, income is more than 69 times higher at the top compared to the bottom
of the distribution. However, to know more about the structure of this distribution, I now
analyse in which income decile the single countries are located.
11For more information about the Gini decomposition see Pyatt (1976), Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991),
Yitzhaki (1994), Lambert and Aronson (1993), or Yao and Liu (1996).
7
020
40
60
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99
Income group (percentile)
An
nu
a
l i
nc
om
e 
in
 th
ou
sa
nd
 €
 (P
PP
−a
dju
ste
d)
Income distribution in the EU−28
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
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for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
This Figure illustrates the income distribution in the EU-28 and shows that annual mean incomes range from 919€ at the 1st to
63,540€ at the 99th income percentile.
FIGURE 1 — Income Distribution in the EU-28 per percentile, 2014
Table 10 (appendix) gives an overview of each nation’s population share within the Euro-
pean income distribution. Using these numbers and following an approach by Beblo and
Knaus (2001) I calculate an index which illustrates a country’s relative representation in a
certain income decile of the EU-28. A value above (below) one illustrates that the country
is over-represented (under-represented) with regard to its relative population share. Ger-
many for example amounts for around 16% of the EU-28 population. However, 4.98% of its
population is in the first income decile whereas 27.65% contribute to the top income decile.
Thus, Figure 2 shows that Germany is under-represented in the lowest income decile, with
an index of 0.31 but over-represented at the top, with an index of 1.72. This means that
Germany has 69% less inhabitants in the lowest and 72% more inhabitants in the highest
European income decile as we would expect if its population would be equally distributed
among the European income distribution.
To test if countries with similar socio-economic policies and institutions show a comparable
pattern in their income distribution, this study clusters the results with regard to the relative
representation among income deciles in the EU-28, into six country groups. The results are
plotted in Figure 2 and illustrate highly similar patterns for four of the six country groups.
Thus, all Social-Democratic countries (SDC), continental European economies (CEE) and
liberal market economies (LME) are under-represented in the first and over-represented
in the tenth income decile, while Baltic countries (BC) show the opposite result. However,
Mediterranean countries (MC) and eastern European countries (EEC) show a rather hetero-
geneous picture in their relative representation. Within EEC Slovenia and the Czech Repub-
lic are both under-represented at the bottom and the top of the income distribution, whereas
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the rest in this country groups is over-represented at the bottom and under-represented at
the top. Moreover, especially with regard to the lowest income decile, MC split into two
poles as Cyprus, Italy and Malta are heavily under-represented, while Greece, Portugal and
Spain are over-represented at the bottom of the income distribution. On country level, the
results show two significant outliers, which picture the gap in prosperity between the mem-
ber states of the EU. In the first decile, Romania is heavily over-represented and shows an
index of 6.6, whereas Luxembourg shows an index of 4.3 for the top income decile.
4.2 Decomposition by countries
However, to extend the analysis of the composition of the European income inequality, this
study now turns to the decomposition of the Theil index. Table 2 refers to country-Theils
which vary between a value of 0.099 in Slovakia and 0.430 in Romania. Moreover, Table 2
shows each country’s contribution to the aggregated inequality of 0.215 in the EU-28. The
results indicate that the largest five countries Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy
and Spain are responsible for 56.6% of the aggregated Theil index. The between-component
accounts for 21.7%, which means that 21.7% of the total inequality in the EU-28 is due to
the other 23 countries.
A former result of Beblo and Knaus (2001) who analyse the founding countries of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union for 1995 shows that between-country inequality account for 9.3%
to the inequality measure of 0.185. A more recent study of Papatheodorou and Pavlopoulos
(2014) for the EU-15 in 2008 shows a Theil index of 0.148 and a contribution of between-
country differences of 4.9%. Therefore, my results show that income inequality and the
relative contribution of between-country differences increased significantly for an enlarged
EU-28.
4.3 Decomposition by country groups
This study now analyses the contribution of inequality within- and between-country-groups
with similar socio-economic policies and institutions.12 Table 3 illustrates that country
groups divide into two poles. The lowest inequality is found in SDC (0.125) followed by
CEE (0.158) and LME (0.175), which are the three country groups with the highest an-
nual mean incomes. On the other hand, inequality is highest in BC (0.233), EEC (0.223)
and MC (0.198), which are the country groups with the lowest annual mean incomes. Thus,
high income country groups show lower income inequality compared to low income country
groups. To analyse the roots of this finding, this study evaluates the effect of governmental
redistribution in section 5.
12All inhabitants of a country group are treated as they would live in a single country. Moreover, personal
cross-sectional weights are used to adjust for the country size.
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(b) Mediterranean countries
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(c) Eastern European countries
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(d) Liberal market economies
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(e) Social-Democratic countries
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(f) Central European economies
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Based on Aristei and Perugini (2015), countries are clustered into country groups with regard to similar socio-
economic policies and institutions.
Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference
year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
The index on the y-axis illustrates a country’s relative representation in a certain income decile of the EU-28. A value
above (below) one illustrates that the country is over-represented (under-represented) with regard to its relative
population share.
The results show that CEE, LME and SDC are overrepresented at the tenth and underrepresented at the first income
decile, whereas BC show the opposite result. Moreover, two countries stand out significantly. Luxembourg has
more than four times more people at the top, while Romania shows over six times more people at the bottom of
the income distribution, as we would expect if their populations would be equally distributed among the European
income distribution.
FIGURE 2 — Income distribution in the EU-28 per decile among country groups - Relative
Representation, 2014
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TABLE 2 — Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 by country, 2014
Country Theil index Annual Mean
Income
Inequality
Sharea(%)
Economic
weightb(%)
AT 0.141 23,953 1.5 2.2
BE 0.121 21,852 1.5 2.6
BG 0.251 8,930 0.8 0.7
CY 0.233 18,387 0.2 0.2
CZ 0.114 13,340 0.8 1.5
DE 0.162 23,409 15.3 20.3
DK 0.158 23,757 1.1 1.5
EE 0.196 13,363 0.2 0.2
EL 0.211 10,567 1.2 1.2
ES 0.195 17,291 7.9 8.7
FI 0.112 21,320 0.7 1.3
FR 0.165 22,821 12.0 15.6
HR 0.156 9,690 0.3 0.4
HU 0.138 9,105 0.6 1.0
IE 0.152 22,424 0.8 1.1
IT 0.178 18,000 9.8 11.9
LT 0.258 10,972 0.4 0.3
LU 0.143 33,212 0.1 0.2
LV 0.211 10,366 0.2 0.2
MT 0.136 19,066 0.1 0.1
NL 0.133 21,856 2.5 4.0
PL 0.163 11,135 3.5 4.6
PT 0.204 12,734 1.4 1.4
RO 0.430 5,404 2.3 1.2
SE 0.110 21,977 1.2 2.3
SI 0.102 16,473 0.2 0.4
SK 0.099 11,084 0.3 0.6
UK 0.177 20,642 11.6 14.2
Between
countries
– – 21.7 –
Europe 0.215 18,371 100 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The
income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a The inequality share represents the contribution of a country to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
b The economic weight describes the income share of a country with regard to the overall income of the
EU-28.
TABLE 3 — Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 by country
group, 2014
Country
group
Theil
index
Annual Mean
Income
Inequality
Sharea(%)
Economic
weightb(%)
BC 0.233 11,282 0.8 0.8
CEE 0.158 23,015 33.0 45.0
EEC 0.223 9,866 10.7 10.4
LME 0.175 20,764 12.5 15.3
MC 0.198 16,710 21.7 23.5
SDC 0.125 22,288 2.9 5.1
Between
country
groups
0.040 – 18.4 –
Europe 0.215 18,371 100 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-
28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the
EU-SILC are used.
a The inequality share represents the contribution of a country group to the overall inequality
of the EU-28.
b The economic weight describes the income share of a country group with regard to the overall
income of the EU-28.
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4.4 Decomposition by demographic groups
This subsection shows the influence of demographic subgroups on income inequality with
a decomposition by household types. Moreover, it analyses whether inequality between-
demographic-groups or between-countries contribute more to the aggregated income in-
equality of the EU-28. Therefore, I follow Beblo and Knaus (2001) and split the sample into
three groups with regard to the household structure. The first group consists of households
with household heads13 (hh) older than 59 years. Households with hh younger than 60 are
divided into households without and with children respectively.
4.4.1 Demographic groups on country level
Table 4 shows that hh with children (0.200) have the lowest, whereas hh above 59 (0.229)
have the highest income inequality in the EU-28. The same result is found by Beblo and
Knaus (2001), who argue that in most social protection systems, pensions depend on for-
mer gross-earnings and therefore reflect past income inequality. Moreover, income inequal-
ity of households with hh above 59 years show also the largest span among demographic
groups and range between a Theil index of 0.070 in Slovakia and 1.098 in Romania. The
other two demographic groups show a significant smaller span and range between a Theil
index of 0.085 in Slovakia and 0.234 in Lithuania, for hh without children, and between
0.078 in Sweden and 0.300 in Lithuania, for hh with children. Interestingly, in Estonia
the overall Theil index is higher than the indices of each demographic subgroup. Com-
paring the mean incomes of each subgroup, I detect that they vary tremendously between
9,805€ for hh above 59 years and 13,945€ for hh without children. Thus, it seems that
between-demographic-group inequality is responsible that overall inequality exceeds in-
equality within any of the three demographic groups. However, as pension payments seem
to play a crucial role for the construction of income inequality, this study will analyse the
impact of the pension system on income inequality in a sensitivity analysis in section 6.
In addition, the results in Table 5 show that between-country inequality (21.7%) contributes
significantly more to the overall inequality of the EU-28 than between-demographic-group
inequality (0.82%). Moreover, hh without children account for about two fifths (44.46%)
of the overall inequality, followed by hh with children (31.05%) and hh above 59 years
(23.67%). However, differences among countries regarding the contribution of each demo-
graphic group are significant. The contribution of hh above 59 years ranges from around
10% in Slovakia to around 60% in Romania. The same holds true for hh without children,
for which the range lies between around 20% in Romania and around 52% in Germany. Fi-
nally, the span for hh with children ranges from around 19% in Romania to around 45% in
Ireland. These findings illustrate that inequality within demographic groups as well as their
13The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18 years of age. When
two household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
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contribution to overall inequality vary tremendously among member states. Therefore, an
European wide social policy should consider each country’s specific situation. Nevertheless,
the next subsection focuses on country groups and should detect which framework of socio-
economic policies and institutions provide the best foundation for low income inequality.
4.4.2 Demographic groups on country group level
Table 6 presents the results on country group level and shows that SDC have the lowest
income inequality among all demographic groups. However, inequality for hh above 59
years is highest in EEC (0.311), while BC have the highest inequality for hh without (0.214)
and with (0.248) children. The same as on country level income inequality among country
groups ranges most for hh above 59 and least for hh without children, which again indicates
the influence of the pension system on income inequality.
Furthermore, Table 7 shows the contribution of demographic subgroups to country group
inequality. The results illustrate that in all country groups, hh without children contribute
the most, while hh above 59 years contribute the least to total income inequality. Nonethe-
less, the contribution of each demographic group varies significantly among country groups.
Households older than 59 years account for 13.54% of inequality in BC, compared to 26.27%
in CEE. Moreover, the contribution for hh with children varies between 27.08% in CEE and
41.05% in BC.
Thus, I find a heterogeneous situation regarding income inequality and the contribution of
demographic groups to inequality among countries and country groups. The results show
that SDC have the lowest inequality among all demographic groups. Socio-economic policies
and institutions in SDC seem to offer a good environment for low income inequality inde-
pendently of household characteristics. Hence, social policies at the national level seem to
have a significant impact on income inequality in the EU-28 andmay be a driver of economic
disparities. To test this hypothesis, I follow Beblo and Knaus (2001) and assume that the
amount of social expenditures influence income inequality and illustrate in the appendix
the relationship between social security expenditures in percent of GDP on the y-axes and
country-Theils on the x-axes in Figure 5. The results show a significant negative relationship
between the two and illustrate that the lower social expenditures of a member state regard-
ing its GDP, the higher is its income inequality. Yet, this relationship says anything about
the degree of redistribution in a country. Thus, the impact of government redistribution, by
comparing inequality with regard to pre- and post-transfer incomes, is analysed in section
5.
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TABLE 4 — Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 by
country and demographic type, 2014
Age of the Household Heada
Country < 60, with-
out children
< 60, chil-
dren
≥ 60 all
AT 0.135 0.122 0.161 0.141
BE 0.116 0.099 0.157 0.121
BG 0.210 0.275 0.259 0.251
CY 0.218 0.215 0.307 0.233
CZ 0.109 0.127 0.075 0.114
DE 0.174 0.147 0.147 0.162
DK 0.161 0.147 0.165 0.158
EE 0.183 0.190 0.171 0.196
EL 0.209 0.230 0.182 0.211
ES 0.184 0.211 0.187 0.195
FI 0.122 0.081 0.133 0.112
FR 0.166 0.125 0.209 0.165
HR 0.148 0.135 0.183 0.156
HU 0.144 0.131 0.120 0.138
IE 0.152 0.144 0.166 0.152
IT 0.166 0.176 0.187 0.178
LT 0.234 0.300 0.188 0.258
LU 0.147 0.148 0.120 0.143
LV 0.190 0.206 0.227 0.211
NL 0.137 0.120 0.145 0.133
PL 0.161 0.162 0.161 0.163
PT 0.206 0.186 0.223 0.204
RO 0.199 0.241 1.098 0.430
SE 0.128 0.078 0.125 0.110
SI 0.099 0.094 0.120 0.102
SK 0.085 0.115 0.070 0.099
UK 0.194 0.151 0.149 0.177
Europe 0.215 0.200 0.229 0.215
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and
PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013.
Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the
age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at
least 18 years of age. When two household members have the same income,
the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
TABLE 5 — Contribution to income inequality in the EU-28 by country and demo-
graphic group, 2014
Contribution to Country Inequality in %
Age of the Household Heada
Country < 60, with-
out children
< 60,
children
≥ 60 variation be-
tween hh
AT 48.98 25.16 22.80 3.05
BE 43.02 30.00 24.37 2.61
BG 40.20 38.94 16.85 4.01
CY 42.44 34.96 22.17 0.43
CZ 44.29 40.28 11.59 3.84
DE 51.62 25.77 21.26 1.35
DK 42.99 33.27 23.34 0.40
EE 40.73 39.80 13.58 5.90
EL 43.97 34.80 20.43 0.79
ES 42.52 36.15 20.59 0.75
FI 46.38 24.75 27.90 0.97
FR 38.70 27.19 32.51 1.60
HR 44.74 30.35 20.54 4.37
HU 51.22 29.69 17.29 1.80
IE 36.39 44.58 18.04 0.99
IT 41.86 29.87 26.47 1.79
LT 42.31 42.45 12.13 3.11
LU 47.31 37.29 14.73 0.67
LV 40.40 38.88 16.43 4.29
NL 43.20 32.57 24.03 0.19
PL 43.06 39.82 16.31 0.81
PT 42.36 31.11 26.00 0.54
RO 20.05 18.77 59.71 1.48
SE 45.57 26.64 26.49 1.30
SI 44.58 34.60 19.99 0.83
SK 43.73 40.17 9.85 6.26
UK 50.51 29.57 16.53 3.40
Variation between
countries, %
21.69 24.47 21.05 –
Europe 44.46 31.05 23.67 0.82
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income
reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18 years of age. When two
household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
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TABLE 6—Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 by country
group and demographic type, 2014
Age of the Household Heada
Country group < 60, with-
out children
< 60, children ≥ 60 all
BC 0.214 0.248 0.198 0.233
CEE 0.164 0.132 0.175 0.158
EEC 0.190 0.214 0.311 0.223
LME 0.192 0.152 0.151 0.175
MC 0.188 0.202 0.205 0.199
SDC 0.137 0.100 0.139 0.125
Europe 0.215 0.200 0.229 0.215
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted
(EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights
from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of
individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18
years of age. When two household members have the same income, the oldest person
is chosen to be the household head.
TABLE 7 — Contribution to income inequality in the EU-28 by country group and
demographic group, 2014
Contribution to Country Group Inequality in %
Age of the Household Heada
Country group < 60, with-
out children
< 60,
children
≥ 60 variation
between hh
BC 41.56 41.05 13.54 3.85
CEE 45.94 27.08 26.27 0.70
EEC 38.82 35.53 24.67 0.98
LME 49.53 30.70 16.64 3.13
MC 42.38 32.24 24.35 1.02
SDC 44.68 28.85 25.63 0.83
Variation between
country groups, %
18.33 20.37 17.56 –
Europe 44.46 31.05 23.67 0.82
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income
reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18 years of age. When two
household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
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5 The effect of government redistribution on income in-
equality in the EU-28
This section tackles the second research question and analyses the effect of government
redistribution on income inequality in the EU-28. I compare the measured Theil14 of equiv-
alised market household income (income before social transfers and taxes) and equivalised
disposable household income (income after social transfers and taxes). The results provide
insights about how social cohesion in the EU-28 is affected by income redistribution at the
national level.
5.1 Redistribution on country level
The results in Table 8 illustrate that after social transfers and taxes income inequality in the
EU-28 decreases significantly from 0.533 (pre-transfers) to 0.215 (post-transfers). Never-
theless, the relative contribution of between-country inequality to the aggregated inequality
increases from 10.1% (pre-transfers) to 21.7% (post-transfers). Thus, government redistri-
bution increases the relative contribution of between-country differences, which indicates
that the degree of redistribution varies among member states. This is driven by differences
in income levels as the results in section 4 show that country groups with high annual mean
incomes show the lowest income inequality.
Thus, I follow the conjecture of Beblo and Knaus (2001) who assume “[...] that richer coun-
tries have more extensive social protection schemes in order to lower the gap between high and
low income earners” (Beblo and Knaus, 2001, p. 317) and test their hypothesis for the coun-
tries of the EU-28. Hence, Figure 3 compares the relationship between post-transfer annual
mean incomes and (a) inequality, (b) expenditures for social security and (c) redistribution.
The results show a significant negative relationship between post-transfer annual mean in-
comes and inequality. Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates a significant positive relationship be-
tween post-transfer annual mean incomes and expenditures for social security with regard
to GDP. In addition, I find a significant positive relationship between post-transfer annual
mean incomes and the relative reduction of the Theil index after redistribution. Therefore,
the results underline the assumption that high income countries show lower inequality, in-
vest more in social expenditures and reduce inequality at a larger extent than low income
countries.
14The nature of the Theil allows me to consider only incomes greater than zero. Calculating pre-transfer
Theil indices would therefore lead to a loss of many observations as a great number of individuals do not
consider any market income. To have a balanced sample when comparing pre-transfer and post-transfer Theil
indices, I assign each individual with a market income of zero an artificial income of 1 ∗ 10−8.
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Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year
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(a) In this Figure I find a significant negative relationship between annual mean incomes and the amount of income inequality.
(b) This Figure illustrates a significant positive relationship between annual mean incomes and expenditures for social security.
(c) In this Figure the results show a significant positive relationship between annual mean incomes and the reduction of income
inequality due to government redistribution.
FIGURE 3 — The relationship between post-transfer annual mean incomes and redistribution among
countries, 2014
5.2 Redistribution on country group level
To analyse the impact of socio-economic policies and institutions on income inequality, this
subsection investigates the effect of government redistribution on country group level. Ta-
ble 9 shows that all country groups reduce their inequality significantly after social transfers
and taxes. However, after social transfers and taxes the relative contribution of between-
country-group inequality increases tremendously from 8.6% (pre-transfers) to 18.4% (post-
transfers), which indicates a higher variation in country group mean income incomes. To
test the impact of the annual mean income on redistribution I analyse the relationship be-
tween post-transfer annual mean incomes and (a) inequality, (b) social expenditures and
(c) redistribution on country group level in Figure 4.
Figure 4 illustrates the same relationships on country group level and shows that country
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TABLE 8 — Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 before and after gov-
ernment redistribution by country, 2014
Country Pre-Transfer
Theila
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
Theilb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
AT 0.469 2.0 0.141 1.5
BE 0.464 2.3 0.121 1.5
BG 0.469 0.6 0.251 0.8
CY 0.434 0.1 0.233 0.2
CZ 0.402 1.1 0.114 0.8
DE 0.492 19.8 0.162 15.3
DK 0.416 1.3 0.158 1.1
EE 0.441 0.2 0.196 0.2
EL 0.630 1.5 0.211 1.2
ES 0.489 7.3 0.195 7.9
FI 0.442 1.0 0.112 0.7
FR 0.454 12.5 0.165 12.0
HR 0.478 0.4 0.156 0.3
HU 0.425 0.7 0.138 0.6
IE 0.558 1.2 0.152 0.8
IT 0.483 10.6 0.178 9.8
LT 0.544 0.3 0.258 0.4
LU 0.420 0.1 0.143 0.1
LV 0.446 0.2 0.211 0.2
MT 0.381 0.1 0.136 0.1
NL 0.442 3.8 0.133 2.5
PL 0.418 3.6 0.163 3.5
PT 0.565 1.5 0.204 1.4
RO 0.537 1.1 0.430 2.3
SE 0.357 1.6 0.110 1.2
SI 0.399 0.3 0.102 0.2
SK 0.311 0.4 0.099 0.3
UK 0.534 14.4 0.177 11.6
Between
countries
0.054 10.1 0.047 21.7
Europe 0.533 100 0.215 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
TABLE 9 — Sources of income inequality in the EU-28 before and after gov-
ernment redistribution by country group, 2014
Country Pre-Transfer
Theila
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
Theilb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
BC 0.493 0.7 0.233 0.8
CEE 0.474 40.8 0.158 33.0
EEC 0.474 8.9 0.223 10.7
LME 0.535 15.6 0.175 12.5
MC 0.507 21.4 0.198 21.7
SDC 0.403 4.0 0.125 2.9
Between
country
groups
0.046 8.6 0.040 18.4
Europe 0.533 100 0.215 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country group to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
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groups with high post-transfer annual mean incomes have lower inequality, higher rates
of social expenditures and redistribute more than low income country groups. Regarding
redistribution country groups split into two poles. CEE, LME and SDC show the highest
annual mean incomes, social expenditures and reduction in inequality, while BC and EEC
show the opposite result. MC lie between these two extremes and show a moderate degree
of redistribution.
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policies and institutions.
Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for
Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
(a) In this Figure I find a significant negative relationship between annual mean incomes and the amount of income inequality.
(b) This Figure illustrates a significant positive relationship between annual mean incomes and expenditures for social security.
(c) In this Figure the results show a significant positive relationship between annual mean incomes and the reduction of income
inequality due to government redistribution.
FIGURE 4 — The relationship between post-transfer annual mean incomes and redistribution among
country groups, 2014
The results in this section support the hypothesis of Beblo and Knaus (2001) and show that
the richer a country, as measured by annual mean income, the more it invests in social
expenditures and the more it reduces inequality. Thus, I find that differences in economic
power among the member states of the EU-28 have a crucial impact on social cohesion. An
European wide social policy needs therefore to aim for income convergence among member
states and to support economic growth in low income countries, especially in BC and EEC.
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6 Sensitivity analyses
To test the robustness of my results, I carry out two sensitivity analyses and report the
results in the appendix. The first replicates the results in section 4 and 5 by using the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD). This approach investigates if the conclusions in sections 4 and
5 change when population based weights are used instead of income share based weights.
In a second sensitivity analysis, I include old age benefits into market incomes to isolate the
effect of the pension system on income inequality.
6.1 Mean Logarithmic Deviation
As discussed in section 3, I test the reliability of my result by calculating the Mean Logarith-
mic Deviation (MLD) which is defined as
T (0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln

µ
yi

(3)
with
N size of the population
µ mean income
yi individual income
According to Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980) T(0) can be de-
composed as follows
T (0) =
K∑
k=1
pk × T (0)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
within component
+
K∑
k=1
pk ln

µ
µk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
between component
(4)
with
K population subgroup
pk population share of subgroup k
T (0)k MLD of subgroup k
µ mean income
µk mean income of subgroup k
From equation 4 we see that theMLD uses population based weights, pk, for calculating each
country’s contribution to overall inequality, compared to income share based weights when
calculating the Theil index. The main results of this study remain unaltered when using
the MLD, rather than the Theil index. However, some results are sensitive to the choice of
measure used to calculate inequality. First, the use of population based weights of the MLD,
instead of income share based weights, changes the contribution of single countries signif-
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icantly. For example, Romania has an income share of 1.2% but represents around 3.9%
of the EU-28 population. Therefore, when using the MLD, Romania’s contribution to the
aggregated inequality of the EU-28 more than doubles from 2.3% (Theil) to 4.9% (MLD).
However, the MLD indicates an income inequality of 0.229 points in 2014 for the EU-28,
which is slightly higher than the finding of Hoffmeister (2009), who calculates a MLD of
0.216 points for the EU-25 in the year 2000. Second, the results show that the relative con-
tribution of between-country inequality increases significantly from 21.7% (Theil) to 24.7%
(MLD) for disposable income but decreases sharply from 10.1% (Theil) to 2% (MLD) for
market incomes. Third, when I decompose the MLD by demographic groups results change
and households with hh older than 59 years of age show the lowest, while households with
hh without children show the highest income inequality. Forth, analysing the impact of re-
distribution reveals that inequality decreases significantly more after transfers and taxes,
using the MLD (−92.9%) compared to the Theil (−59.7%). Moreover, the results find no
significant relationship between post-transfer annual mean incomes and redistribution on
country group level. To summarise, the main conclusions regarding social cohesion for the
EU-28 remain unaltered, whether using the MLD or the Theil index. Nevertheless, I find
that the use of the MLD changes the contribution of single countries, the relative contribu-
tion of between-country inequality, the results regarding demographic subgroups and the
degree of redistribution.
6.2 The effect of old age benefits on income inequality
According to results of Eurofound (2017), pensions are the most important element of social
benefits with regard to redistribution. They state that notably in BC, EEC and MC the pen-
sion system has a significant role in reducing inequality. Therefore, I include old age benefits
into market incomes and illustrate the impact of the pension system on income inequality.
The results show that inequality for market income significantly decreases from 0.533 to
0.346, when old age benefits are taken into account. However, Table 19 indicates that the
relative contribution of between-country differences increases from 10.1% to 14.7%. The
same holds true when considering country groups in Table 20, where the relative contri-
bution of between-country-group inequality increases from 8.6% to 12.7%. Therefore, the
results show that the inclusion of old age benefits in market incomes lowers inequality but
increases the relative contribution of between-country and between-country-group inequal-
ity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the composition of income inequality in the EU-28 for 2014 in two
steps. First, I decomposed income inequality into a within- and between-component by
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three subgroups, which are defined as countries, country groups and demographic groups.
This approach shows the construction and identifies the sources of income inequality in
Europe. In a second step, I analysed the effect of government redistribution on income
inequality in the EU-28. For the empirical analysis I used the Theil index, an inequality
measure that is additively decomposable, and data from the European Survey on Income
and Living Conditions comprising income data for over half a million observations for the
year 2014.
Decomposing income inequality in the EU-28 shows that between-country inequality con-
tributes around 21.7%, whereas within-country inequality contributes 78.3% to the aggre-
gated Theil index of 0.215. Clustering countries into groups with similar socio-economic
policies and institutions reveals that income inequality is particularly low in Social-Democratic
countries, while Baltic countries show the highest inequality. Income inequality decompo-
sition by demographic groups shows the highest inequality for households with household
heads older than 59 years and the lowest income inequality for household heads with chil-
dren. Furthermore, Social-Democratic countries have the lowest income inequality among
all demographic groups, which indicates the high effectiveness of their social policy. More-
over, government redistribution at the national level reduces income inequality significantly
from 0.533 (pre-transfers) to 0.215 (post-transfers) but leads to an increase in the contri-
bution of between-country inequality from 10.1% (pre-transfers) to 21.7% (post-transfers).
The latter indicates that the amount of redistribution varies tremendously among member
states, which can be explained by the finding that high income countries have lower income
inequality, higher social expenditures and redistribute more than low income countries. In
addition, when testing the robustness of my results by applying theMean Logarithmic Devia-
tion, the results illustrate changes in the contribution of the within- and between-component
and show a decrease in the reduction of inequality after government redistribution. More-
over, the inclusion of old age benefits into market incomes illustrates differences in the
performance of pension systems within the EU-28 as it increases the relative contribution
of between-country and between-country-group inequality.
The results of this study offer two important implications to increase social cohesion for
the EU-28: First, after government redistribution Social-Democratic countries show the
strongest relative reduction in income inequality and the lowest income inequality among
country groups. Therefore, they seem to have the most effective socio-economic policies
and institutions and should work as a role model for the setting up of an European wide
social policy framework. Second, the economic power of a country, as measured by annual
mean income, plays an important role to reduce income inequality. Thus, an EU-28 wide so-
cial policy should aim for income convergence among member states and support economic
growth especially in Baltic and Eastern European countries.
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Appendix
Tables
TABLE 10 — Income distribution in the EU-28 per decile among countries - Population share in %,
2014
Income decile
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Meana
AT 0.34 0.36 0.82 1.06 1.57 1.90 2.43 2.73 2.93 2.84 1.70
BE 0.26 0.80 1.42 2.20 2.39 2.47 2.82 3.39 3.59 2.86 2.22
BG 5.35 3.77 1.96 1.21 0.75 0.47 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.24 1.45
CY 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.17
CZ 1.09 3.28 4.63 3.76 2.96 1.99 1.20 0.80 0.51 0.49 2.07
DE 4.98 6.47 9.59 11.91 15.38 18.55 20.18 20.97 24.67 27.65 16.03
DK 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.71 1.18 1.40 1.57 1.83 2.02 1.71 1.13
EE 0.41 0.57 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.26
EL 5.31 5.04 3.46 2.51 1.79 1.25 0.93 0.55 0.36 0.30 2.15
ES 10.23 9.92 9.88 9.84 9.70 9.48 8.44 8.54 8.03 8.14 9.22
FI 0.10 0.30 0.68 1.11 1.25 1.46 1.56 1.63 1.52 1.20 1.08
FR 1.45 3.90 8.70 11.25 13.78 15.99 17.94 17.70 16.71 17.77 12.52
HR 2.14 2.19 1.42 0.99 0.67 0.43 0.25 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.84
HU 5.07 6.15 3.37 2.12 1.15 0.65 0.43 0.25 0.15 0.09 1.94
IE 0.18 0.32 0.76 0.96 1.09 1.02 1.00 1.22 1.27 1.50 0.93
IT 10.02 10.89 12.94 13.26 13.44 13.94 13.56 12.97 10.96 9.99 12.20
LT 1.67 1.35 0.70 0.62 0.51 0.34 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.15 0.59
LU 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.43 0.10
LV 1.14 0.89 0.55 0.40 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.39
MT 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
NL 0.54 0.91 1.70 3.28 4.13 4.39 5.06 5.01 4.52 4.07 3.36
PL 13.69 18.11 14.02 9.67 6.65 4.50 3.22 2.28 1.59 1.19 7.49
PT 3.42 4.20 3.29 2.79 2.14 1.51 1.07 0.89 0.75 0.73 2.08
RO 26.44 8.58 2.66 1.25 0.54 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 3.97
SE 0.43 0.57 1.06 1.62 1.85 2.31 2.73 3.17 3.38 2.39 1.95
SI 0.13 0.38 0.42 0.53 0.64 0.65 0.50 0.37 0.25 0.15 0.40
SK 1.15 2.30 2.44 1.86 1.38 0.69 0.37 0.17 0.08 0.06 1.05
UK 4.05 8.25 12.50 14.45 14.17 13.84 13.40 14.41 15.58 15.55 12.62
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for
Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
The numbers in this table illustrate a country’s population in the respective income decile of the EU-28 in percentage terms.
a The mean represents a country’s population share within the EU-28.
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TABLE 11 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the EU-28
by country, 2014
Country MLD Annual Mean
Income
Inequality
Sharea(%)
Population
weightb(%)
AT 0.140 23,953 1.0 1.7
BE 0.117 21,852 1.1 2.2
BG 0.246 8,930 1.6 1.4
CY 0.191 18,387 0.1 0.2
CZ 0.106 13,340 1.0 2.1
DE 0.159 23,409 11.1 15.9
DK 0.140 23,757 0.7 1.1
EE 0.207 13,363 0.2 0.3
EL 0.219 10,567 2.1 2.2
ES 0.220 17,291 8.9 9.2
FI 0.108 21,320 0.5 1.1
FR 0.144 22,821 7.9 13.0
HR 0.170 9,690 0.6 0.8
HU 0.139 9,105 1.2 1.9
IE 0.151 22,424 0.6 0.9
IT 0.195 18,000 10.4 12.0
LT 0.251 10,972 0.6 0.6
LU 0.139 33,212 0.1 0.1
LV 0.221 10,366 0.4 0.4
MT 0.131 19,066 0.0 0.1
NL 0.125 21,856 1.8 3.3
PL 0.166 11,135 5.5 7.5
PT 0.209 12,734 1.9 2.1
RO 0.283 5,404 4.9 3.9
SE 0.120 21,977 1.0 1.9
SI 0.104 16,473 0.2 0.4
SK 0.114 11,084 0.5 1.1
UK 0.167 20,642 9.3 12.7
Between
countries
– – 24.7 –
Europe 0.229 18,371 100 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The
income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a The inequality share represents the contribution of a country to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
b The populationweight describes the population share of a country with regard to the overall population
of the EU-28.
TABLE 12 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the
EU-28 by country group, 2014
Country
group
MLD Annual Mean
Income
Inequality
Sharea(%)
Population
weightb(%)
BC 0.237 11,282 1.3 0.8
CEE 0.147 23,015 23.2 45.0
EEC 0.227 9,866 19.1 10.4
LME 0.167 20,764 9.9 15.3
MC 0.219 16,710 24.7 23.5
SDC 0.123 22,288 2.2 5.1
Between
country
groups
0.045 – 19.6 –
Europe 0.229 18,371 100 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-
28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the
EU-SILC are used.
a The inequality share represents the contribution of a country group to the overall inequality
of the EU-28.
b The population weight describes the population share of a country group with regard to the
overall population of the EU-28.
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TABLE 13 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income
inequality in the EU-28 by country and demographic
group, 2014
Age of the Household Heada
Country < 60, with-
out children
< 60, chil-
dren
≥ 60 all
AT 0.138 0.113 0.167 0.140
BE 0.123 0.102 0.117 0.117
BG 0.212 0.276 0.216 0.246
CY 0.198 0.165 0.233 0.191
CZ 0.104 0.120 0.066 0.106
DE 0.173 0.138 0.150 0.159
DK 0.163 0.120 0.127 0.140
EE 0.211 0.206 0.144 0.207
EL 0.227 0.245 0.164 0.219
ES 0.215 0.242 0.183 0.220
FI 0.129 0.078 0.112 0.108
FR 0.148 0.118 0.169 0.144
HR 0.168 0.143 0.186 0.170
HU 0.150 0.137 0.104 0.139
IE 0.162 0.136 0.162 0.151
IT 0.189 0.206 0.178 0.195
LT 0.240 0.292 0.165 0.251
LU 0.147 0.137 0.118 0.139
LV 0.203 0.224 0.204 0.221
NL 0.140 0.111 0.117 0.125
PL 0.170 0.169 0.145 0.166
PT 0.211 0.198 0.216 0.209
RO 0.218 0.291 0.368 0.283
SE 0.156 0.085 0.114 0.120
SI 0.103 0.096 0.116 0.104
SK 0.096 0.138 0.069 0.114
UK 0.183 0.148 0.144 0.167
Europe 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.229
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and
PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013.
Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the
age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at
least 18 years of age. When two household members have the same income,
the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
TABLE 14 — Sensitivity analysis: Contribution to income inequality in the EU-28
by country and demographic group, 2014
Contribution to Country Inequality in %
Age of the Household Heada
Country < 60, with-
out children
< 60,
children
≥ 60 variation be-
tween hh
AT 46.26 26.53 24.11 3.10
BE 43.47 32.53 21.28 2.72
BG 36.78 40.00 18.91 4.30
CY 45.03 34.53 19.92 0.52
CZ 42.19 40.52 13.05 4.25
DE 48.90 25.57 24.15 1.38
DK 47.31 30.63 21.60 0.46
EE 40.31 38.68 14.97 6.04
EL 43.12 37.34 18.79 0.76
ES 42.73 39.65 16.95 0.67
FI 48.17 25.02 25.80 1.01
FR 39.12 31.90 27.15 1.83
HR 41.79 30.65 23.46 4.10
HU 49.32 33.74 15.14 1.80
IE 36.54 43.12 19.34 1.00
IT 40.28 35.64 22.42 1.66
LT 40.89 41.57 14.15 3.39
LU 47.28 37.77 14.26 0.69
LV 38.08 38.61 18.91 4.40
NL 45.93 32.89 20.97 0.21
PL 42.15 41.45 15.60 0.79
PT 40.12 33.65 25.71 0.53
RO 31.60 39.70 26.43 2.27
SE 47.85 27.66 23.31 1.18
SI 44.12 34.46 20.59 0.83
SK 38.59 46.41 9.56 5.44
UK 44.41 33.40 18.64 3.55
Variation between
countries, %
24.41 26.55 26.09 –
Europe 42.25 35.32 21.66 0.77
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income
reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18 years of age. When two
household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
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TABLE 15 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality
in the EU-28 by country group and demographic group, 2014
Age of the Household Heada
Country group < 60, with-
out children
< 60, children ≥ 60 all
BC 0.227 0.256 0.176 0.237
CEE 0.158 0.124 0.156 0.147
EEC 0.211 0.247 0.210 0.227
LME 0.182 0.148 0.145 0.167
MC 0.215 0.231 0.200 0.219
SDC 0.151 0.094 0.118 0.123
Europe 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.229
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted
(EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights
from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of
individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18
years of age. When two household members have the same income, the oldest person
is chosen to be the household head.
TABLE 16 — Sensitivity analysis: Contribution to income inequality in the EU-28
by country group and demographic group, 2014
Contribution to Country Inequality in %
Age of the Household Heada
Country group < 60, with-
out children
< 60,
children
≥ 60 variation
between hh
BC 39.98 40.23 15.72 4.07
CEE 45.10 28.83 25.32 0.75
EEC 39.38 41.77 17.89 0.96
LME 43.86 34.19 18.70 3.26
MC 41.47 36.54 21.05 0.94
SDC 47.60 28.20 23.36 0.85
Variation between
country groups, %
19.18 20.08 21.22 –
Europe 42.25 35.32 21.66 0.77
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income
reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
Malta had to be excluded because it does not report information about the age of individuals.
a The household head is defined as the person with the highest income of at least 18 years of age. When two
household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen to be the household head.
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TABLE 17 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the EU-28
before and after government redistribution by country, 2014
Country Pre-Transfer
MLDa
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
MLDb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
AT 2.487 1.0 0.140 1.0
BE 3.637 1.9 0.117 1.1
BG 3.468 1.2 0.246 1.6
CY 2.522 0.1 0.191 0.1
CZ 3.470 1.7 0.106 1.0
DE 2.684 10.3 0.159 11.1
DK 1.307 0.3 0.140 0.7
EE 4.070 0.3 0.207 0.2
EL 5.887 3.0 0.219 2.1
ES 2.568 5.6 0.220 8.9
FI 2.201 0.6 0.108 0.5
FR 1.526 4.6 0.144 7.9
HR 5.030 1.0 0.170 0.6
HU 4.100 1.8 0.139 1.2
IE 5.660 1.3 0.151 0.6
IT 3.201 9.4 0.195 10.4
LT 4.872 0.7 0.251 0.6
LU 2.417 0.1 0.139 0.1
LV 3.495 0.3 0.221 0.4
MT 0.923 0.0 0.131 0.0
NL 1.616 1.3 0.125 1.8
PL 4.090 7.3 0.166 5.5
PT 4.951 2.5 0.209 1.9
RO 5.205 5.0 0.283 4.9
SE 1.569 0.7 0.120 1.0
SI 2.622 0.3 0.104 0.2
SK 3.667 0.9 0.114 0.5
UK 3.985 12.0 0.167 9.3
Between
countries
0.065 2.0 0.057 24.7
Europe 3.214 100 0.229 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
TABLE 18 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the EU-28
before and after government redistribution by country group, 2014
Country
group
Pre-Transfer
MLDa
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
MLDb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
BC 4.271 1.7 0.237 1.3
CEE 2.232 25.0 0.147 23.2
EEC 4.247 25.4 0.227 19.1
LME 4.100 17.3 0.167 9.9
MC 3.339 26.9 0.219 24.7
SDC 1.678 2.1 0.123 2.2
Between
country
groups
0.051 1.6 0.045 19.6
Europe 3.214 100 0.229 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country group to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
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TABLE 19 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the EU-28
before and after government redistribution by country (including old-age
benefits in market income), 2014
Country Pre-Transfer
Theila
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
Theilb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
AT 0.267 1.8 0.141 1.5
BE 0.267 2.0 0.121 1.5
BG 0.292 0.5 0.251 0.8
CY 0.337 0.1 0.233 0.2
CZ 0.201 0.8 0.114 0.8
DE 0.284 17.4 0.162 15.3
DK 0.277 1.3 0.158 1.1
EE 0.273 0.1 0.196 0.2
EL 0.331 1.3 0.211 1.2
ES 0.347 7.8 0.195 7.9
FI 0.257 0.9 0.112 0.7
FR 0.266 11.7 0.165 12.0
HR 0.324 0.4 0.156 0.3
HU 0.221 0.6 0.138 0.6
IE 0.414 1.2 0.152 0.8
IT 0.293 10.3 0.178 9.8
LT 0.355 0.3 0.258 0.4
LU 0.242 0.1 0.143 0.1
LV 0.282 0.2 0.211 0.2
MT 0.230 0.1 0.136 0.1
NL 0.269 3.6 0.133 2.5
PL 0.231 3.1 0.163 3.5
PT 0.362 1.6 0.204 1.4
RO 0.529 1.8 0.430 2.3
SE 0.209 1.4 0.110 1.2
SI 0.234 0.2 0.102 0.2
SK 0.153 0.3 0.099 0.3
UK 0.361 14.4 0.177 11.6
Between
countries
0.051 14.7 0.047 21.7
Europe 0.346 100 0.215 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
TABLE 20 — Sensitivity analysis: Sources of income inequality in the EU-
28 before and after government redistribution by country group (including
old-age benefits in market income), 2014
Country
group
Pre-Transfer
Theila
Pre-Transfer
Sharec (%)
Post-Transfer
Theilb
Post-Transfer
Sharec (%)
BC 0.316 0.6 0.233 0.8
CEE 0.276 36.7 0.158 33.0
EEC 0.302 8.8 0.223 10.7
LME 0.364 15.6 0.175 12.5
MC 0.327 21.8 0.198 21.7
SDC 0.245 3.7 0.125 2.9
Between
country
groups
0.044 12.7 0.040 18.4
Europe 0.346 100 0.215 100
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015
Notes: All income are PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-
sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
a Income is defined as equivalised market household income.
b Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income.
c The share represents the contribution of a country group to the overall inequality of the EU-28.
2
8
Figures
ATBE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FR
HR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
15
20
25
30
35
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Theil measure for disposable equivalised household income 2014
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s 
fo
r 
so
ci
al
 s
ec
ur
ity
,
 
%
 o
f G
DP
 2
01
4
Adj R2 =  0.15455 Intercept = 0.2864  Slope = −0.0047476  P = 0.021994
Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC 2014 & 2015, Eurostat
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This Figure illustrates a significant negative relationship between social expenditures for social security and the value of the Theil
index.
FIGURE 5 — The relationship between social expenditures and income inequality among countries,
2014
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The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
This Figure illustrates a significant negative relationship between social expenditures for social security
and the value of the MLD.
FIGURE 6— Sensitivity analysis: The relationship between social expenditures and income inequality
among countries, 2014
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The income reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
(a) In this Figure I find a significant negative relationship between annual mean incomes and the
amount of income inequality.
(b) This Figure illustrates an insignificant relationship between annual mean incomes and the reduction
of income inequality due to government redistribution.
FIGURE 7 — Sensitivity analysis: The relationship between post-transfer annual mean incomes and
redistribution among countries, 2014
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Notes: Based on Aristei and Perugini (2015), countries are clustered into country groups with regard
to similar socio-economic policies and institutions.
Income is defined as equivalised disposable household income and PPP-adjusted (EU-28=1). The in-
come reference year for Germany is 2013. Cross-sectional weights from the EU-SILC are used.
(a) In this Figure I find a significant negative relationship between annual mean incomes and the
amount of income inequality.
(b) This Figure illustrates an insignificant relationship between annual mean incomes and the reduction
of income inequality due to government redistribution.
FIGURE 8 — Sensitivity analysis: The relationship between post-transfer annual mean incomes and
redistribution among country groups, 2014
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